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Social Justice and the Charter:
Comparison and Choice
MARGOT YOUNG *
At a time of radical inequality, the changes sought by social justice advocacy are urgently needed. Yet repeatedly, courts fail to respond adequately to this challenge. A core issue plagues
social justice jurisprudence under sections 7 and 15: the difficulty inevitable in the contemplation and expression of the social and political forms in which oppression and social
injustice occur. This problem manifests doctrinally in ways specific to the rights at issue.
In section 15 cases, the casting of comparator groups has been deeply problematic, and in
both section 15 and section 7 cases, the courts fail to deliver a nuanced understanding of
how notions of choice ought (and ought not) to figure in the consideration of rights claims.
Judgments map a complex reality in both powerful and necessarily incomplete ways. Judicial
attentiveness to this fact will determine the role that the Charter does or does not play in the
reach for social justice.
À une époque d’inégalité radicale, les changements que recherchent les défenseurs de la
justice sociale s’avèrent nécessaires de toute urgence. Pourtant, les tribunaux évitent
constamment de réagir à ce défi de façon appropriée. Une question fondamentale entrave la
jurisprudence de la justice sociale en vertu des articles 7 et 15, soit la difficulté inéluctable
de l’examen et de l’expression de la forme sociale et politique sous laquelle surviennent
l’oppression et la justice sociale. Ce problème se manifeste au plan doctrinaire de manières
particulières aux droits dont il est question. En fonction de l’article 15, le choix de groupes
comparatifs s’est avéré considérablement problématique, et dans les causes relevant tant de
l’article 15 que de l’article 7, les tribunaux n’offrent pas une compréhension nuancée de la
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manière dont les notions de choix devraient ou non figurer lors de l’examen des réclamations
ayant trait aux droits. Les jugements dépeignent une réalité complexe et forcément incomplète.
L’attention judiciaire accordée à ce fait déterminera le rôle que la Charte jouera ou ne jouera
pas dans la quête de la justice sociale.
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IT IS NOT THAT THE COURTS have not had the right case. Nor is it that smart

doctrinal arguments have yet to be made. Yet, in thirty years of litigation under
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 social justice victories are few and
slim. This is not the future many social justice activists heralded in 1982.2 Why
has Charter litigation proven such barren ground for social justice intervention?
The question is an important one. We face, in political theorist Nancy Fraser’s
words, “a time when an aggressively expanding capitalism is radically exacerbating economic inequality.”3 The changes that social justice advocacy litigation
seeks are urgently needed. In this context, judicial treatment of constitutions
has at least two significant implications for constitutional democracies such as
Canada.4 First, judicial review is an important accountability measure. It provides
some means for holding the exercise of power, at least by the state, to collectively
generated norms, limits, and standards as signalled by a country’s constitution.
Thus, judicial review under the Charter, at its best, serves as a cross-check on
otherwise legally unassailable government action and funding decisions. Rights
litigation in particular does this by providing a forum and metric for evaluation
1.
2.
3.
4.

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Charter].
See Bruce Porter, “Twenty Years of Equality Rights: Reclaiming Expectations” (2005) 23:1
Windsor YB Access Just 145 [Porter, “Reclaiming Expectations”].
“Rethinking Recognition” 3 New Left Review 107 at 108.
Enjoining the debate over judicial review is not my purpose here. For an interesting
foray into that territory, see James B Kelly & Michael Murphy, “Confronting Judicial
Supremacy: A Defence of Judicial Activism and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Legal Rights
Jurisprudence” (2001) 16:1 CJLS 3.
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of state action in accordance with the protections set out in a bill of rights. This
process provides a highly public site for the articulation of claims, often catalyzing a
broader political and social appreciation of otherwise more subterranean issues of
distribution, participation, and voice.5 As two legal academics scribe, “The benefit
of a Charter challenge is that it can serve both as a forum for the deliberation of
resource allocation, and as a catalyst for wider public debate … .”6 In this sense,
Charter litigation is used as potentially both “a tool and a terrain”7 for pushing
social change.
Second, as the courts perform this task, the judiciary sends powerful and
influential messages about the perpetuation and evolution of norms that are
central and critical to our polity. These messages shape how we understand our
shared political community and key relationships between the state, society, and
the individual.8 John Whyte writes that the introduction of a bill of rights into
our Constitution9 ushered in a “new paradigm—a range of constitution-based
controls of the relationship between state and citizen … shift[ing] a significant
class of personal interests from the domain of politics to that of law … .”10
Whether such strong judicial influence and power is politically desirable or
not, it is nonetheless the era that the Charter confirms. Court pronouncements
speak loudly, legitimating certain visions of society and de-legitimating others.
What those messages are matters. We may decry the influence given to courts,
but we cannot deny that in the current mock-up it is no small concern what
they pronounce.11
5.

Bruce Porter, “Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights, Equality, and Citizenship” in
Margot Young et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2007) 77.
6. Colleen M Flood & Michelle Zimmerman, “Judicious Choices: Health Care Resource
Decisions and the Supreme Court” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds, Health Law at
the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 25 at 54.
7. The linkage of these two notions is Martha Jackman’s. See Martha Jackman, “Constitutional
Castaways: Poverty and the McLachlin Court” [Jackman, “Castaways”] in Sanda Rodgers
& Sheila McIntyre, eds, The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment,
Retrenchment or Retreat (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) 297 at 299 [Rodgers &
McIntyre, Social Justice]. The phrase captures strategic use of the Charter as both a method of
and a platform for advocacy.
8. See generally Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last Word: Media
Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
9. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
10. “The Charter at 30: A Reflection” (2012) 17:1 Rev Const Stud 1 at 1.
11. In this statement, I demonstrate a key inclination of what Gavin Anderson describes as the
third phase of Canadian constitutional criticism. Anderson argues that in such criticism, “the
key consideration is pragmatic: Even if far from ideal, rights constitutionalism cannot simply
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This article takes up the question of the scarcity and paucity of successful social
justice rights challenges by looking at jurisprudence under sections 7 and 15 of
the Charter—the sections that provide protection for life, liberty, and security of
person, and that guarantee equality respectively. Notably, the text of the Charter
provides no explicit guarantees of social and economic rights.12 Consequently,
legal activism has focused on one or the other of these two sections as an
expandable base for textual interpretation that would allow for some specific
social and economic protection. Social justice claims have thus cycled between
these two Charter provisions as ciphers for rendering the Charter more responsive
to the injustices of twenty-first century Canadian society.
The term “social justice” is used in this article in a loose and embracive
manner (also, perhaps, in an abrasive manner, as I wish it to have some “scouring”
force). The Supreme Court of Canada itself has used the phrase “social justice,”
although, as Heather McLeod-Kilmurray notes, clear elaboration by the Court
of what the notion signals—either in general or in the specific context of the case
at play—is lacking.13 For the purposes of this article, “social justice” signifies
claims for more just distribution, recognition, and empowerment.14 At study is
litigation that has, as its goal, redistribution of privilege and disadvantage in a
more politically justifiable manner. In particular, I reference Janine Brodie’s
formulation that accounts for the significance of attaching the term “social” to
the idea of “justice.”15 Brodie argues that the conjoining of the terms “social” and
“justice” allows recognition of the key political goal of fixing the “inherent gap
between liberalism’s promise of citizen equality and the structural inequalities of
capitalism.”16 In the constitutional legal context, it is about affirming and asserting

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

be wished away, and it remains a key site of democratic struggle.” Gavin W Anderson, “The
New Borders of the Constitutional” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 737 at 745-46.
In this sense, our Charter is an older generation of a bill of rights, one that omits explicit
protection of at least some social and economic rights.
“Does Preserving the Environment Advance or Conflict with Social Justice and Human
Rights?” in Rodgers & McIntyre, Social Justice, supra note 7 at 465. McLeod-Kilmurray goes
on to spell out the connection between social justice and environmental protection, noting
that the two have complex involvements. This is, of course, beyond the scope of this article,
but indicates how rich and complex the political deployment and projection of social justice
necessarily is (ibid at 466-70).
See the discussion in Nancy Fraser, “Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A TwoDimensional Approach to Gender Justice” (2007) 1:1 Stud in Soc Just 23 at 24.
“Reforming Social Justice in Neoliberal Times” (2007) 1:2 Stud in Soc Just 93 at 93-95.
Ibid at 98. For a longer discussion of this, see Margot Young, “Unequal to the Task:
‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15” [Young, “Unequal”] in Rodgers &
McIntyre, Social Justice, supra note 7.
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the “responsibilities on government to identify and proactively address issues of
socio-economic disadvantage and systemic discrimination … .”17
Social justice challenges across sections 7 and 15 have had mixed success.
Generally, the courts have not been receptive to cases that plead the causes of
the most economically marginalized and disadvantaged in our society. Cases that
have recently been successful have often looked to section 7 rights as an anchor
for specific and narrow justice claims of marginalized groups.18 Section 15 claims
raising similar social justice aspirations have tended to meet with failure. Indeed,
one might argue that section 15 doctrine is stalled—the Court is apparently stymied
as to how to elaborate a functional and substantive approach to equality claims.
Section 7 doctrine, in contrast, has proven quite amenable to a more contextual
and nuanced appraisal in at least a few cases, although important qualifications
pertain here.
This article does not attempt to decide which of the two sections is the best
bet for future social justice challenges. Instead, the article’s purpose is to identify
a central tension apparent in articulations of social justice claims that figures
significantly in the jurisprudence of both sets of rights. This article argues that a
core concern plagues social justice Charter litigation per se. This issue manifests
itself slightly differently in section 15 and section 7 cases given the doctrinal
variations of the two sections. But it is this article’s argument that an issue is
common across all social justice litigation. Quickly spun, the challenge is that
courts have failed to contemplate adequately the social and political form in
which oppression and social injustice occur.19 Central to this is a failure to theorize
and to address fully the manner in which individual harm and systemic fields of
social power hierarchies co-occur. This confounding of individual and systemic
features of oppression condemns courts to overly simplistic, thin, and ultimately
unsatisfactory contemplation of the social injustices these cases foreground.
The tasks, then, that this paper takes up are to chronicle social justice cases
across both sections 7 and 15, to assess some of the case law these decisions have
generated, and to analyze where and how opportunities best lie for social justice
Charter rights litigation. A variety of critical perspectives on Charter litigation
generally as well as issues specific to each of these rights sections will inform the
17. Porter, “Reclaiming Expectations,” supra note 2 at 172.
18. See e.g. Attorney General of Canada et al v Bedford et al, 2012 ONCA 186, 109 OR (3d) 1;
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, 3 SCR 134
[Insite (SCC)].
19. I am not making any claims in this article about the specific forms of harm that oppression
takes. For this question, see Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression” in Justice and the
Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) ch 2.
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analysis. Part I of the article is an elaboration of the conceptual challenge that oppression, and its social justice responses, present to Charter rights litigation. This
Part invokes more theoretical treatment of social injustice, and of the harms that one
would wish sections 15 and 7 to recognize, by looking at social theorists’ treatment of
oppression and power. Part II introduces the specific doctrinal challenges of both
sections 7 and 15 triggered by the courts’ failures to comprehend successfully
the interconnection and layering of oppression. This failure has some sectionspecific implications: In section 15 it has rendered the casting of comparator
groups deeply problematic, and in both section 7 and section 15 it has allowed
the courts to engage problematic notions of choice as spoilers of rights claims.
The final Part concludes with the recognition that adequate consideration of the
relationship between individual harm and systemic hierarchies is difficult, but it
is a challenge importantly engaged.

I. THE CHALLENGE: INDIVIDUALS IN CONTEXT
Nuanced and effective treatment of the relationship between individual harm and
systemic fields of social power is key to any social justice claim. As Sherene Razack
notes, “responses to subordinate groups are socially organized to sustain existing
power arrangements … .”20 Equality theorists—particularly those schooled in
law—have been articulate in theorizing the complex placement of persons and
groups in broader patterns of hierarchy and oppression informed by a range of
social divisions. Debate continues about how to interpret the relationship
between social divisions and how to conceptualize the different analytic levels
at which to understand such relationships.21 Nira Yuval-Davis argues that social
divisions operate at a number of levels: Social divisions have “organizational,
intersubjective, experiential and representational forms … .”22 These divisions “are
expressed in specific institutions and organizations …” and “involve specific power
and affective relationships between actual people” that affect how individuals
experience their daily lives.23 They also adhere at the level of representation; that
20. Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 8.
21. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics” (2006) 13:3 Eur J Wom Stud at
195 [Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality”].
22. Ibid at 198. Other theorists articulate other differences across analyses. See e.g. Ina Kerner,
“Feminist Theory and the Representation of Diversity” (Paper delivered at the American
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2012), online: <http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2104789>.
23. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 198.

YOUNG, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CHARTER 675

is, they are expressed in symbols, texts, and ideologies.24 Simply put, group
experiences—as shapers of individual circumstances—are relevant, and the right
to equality is about both groups and individuals as members of the oppressed or
marginalized. There is no “ground zero”25 at which historical and social context
and group membership are irrelevant.26 Social divisions structure and form the
axes of social power, and actual, concrete people are caught up along these axes.27
The resulting hierarchies of differential access to a range of resources28 constitute
the stuff of equality analyses.
Three important observations have emerged from this literature. First, individual
identity is multiple, fractured, and infinite.29 This means not simply that the world
is diverse (which, of course, it is marvellously), but also that individuals map onto
this diversity in varied, shifting, and numerous ways. As Darren Lenard Hutchinson
writes, “oppression is fluid and contextual and … operates on many different axes.”30
No one vector of identity captures any one individual experience, and we are all
marked—although often do not acknowledge ourselves as such—by every identity
variable at play.31 No person is “left untouched,”32 and no single category can
capture the “wide range of different experiences, identities, and social locations”
in the world.33 Social divisions “are not reducible to each other.”34 The insistence
on pigeonholing comparison “falsely homogenize[s] the experiences of different
group members.”35 Thus, the “pixilation of human experience”36 done by the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ibid.
Razack, supra note 20 at 8.
Young, “Unequal,” supra note 16.
Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 198.
Ibid.
See Rita Kaur Dhamoon, “Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality” (2011) 64:1
Pol Res Q 230 at 231.
“New Complexity Theories: From Theoretical Innovation to Doctrinal Reform” (2002) 71
UMKC L Rev 431 at 442.
Nancy Ehrenreich’s discussion of “hybrid intersectionality” offers a compelling account of
how the particular mixes of privilege and oppression many experience co-shape individual
perspectives and circumstances. See Nancy Ehrenreich, “Subordination and Symbiosis:
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems” (2002) 71:2 UMKC L Rev
251 at 266 [Ehrenreich, “Subordination and Symbiosis”].
Kerri A Froc, “Multidimensionality and the Matrix: Identifying Charter Violations in Cases
of Complex Subordination” (2010) 25:1 CJLS 21 at 23.
Leslie McCall, “The Complexity of Intersectionality” (2005) 30:3 Signs: J of Women in
Culture and Soc’y 1771 at 1777.
Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 200.
Nancy Levit, “Introduction: Theorizing the Connections Among Systems of Subordination”
(2002-2003) 71:1 UMKC L Rev 227.
Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ
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categorization of constitutional law has been criticized. Social divisions, while
ontologically distinct from one another, are “always constructed and intermeshed
in other social divisions,”37 are contested, and evolve in context. These social
categories are interactive; they reinforce, challenge, and shape each other, rather
than simply intercross.38 In any analysis of oppression, one must be alert to the
“homogenizing and simplifying dangers of category-based research.”39 The dangers of narratives that ignore such a warning include rendering invisible the most
marginal in any specific social category.40
Second, such identity features are patterned. Power and privilege (and
discrimination and disadvantage) are distributed repetitively—and predictably—
along sets of lines of identity. Yuval-Davis makes the argument that analyses must
retain the multiplexity and multidimensionality of identities within contemporary
society, but without losing sight of the differential power dimension of different
collectivities and groupings within the society and the variety of relationships of
domination/subordination between them.41

Certain identity features are coded as desirable and admirable, others as not so
positive. Discrimination is not randomly distributed, skipping haphazardly from
one trait to another, but piles up in the same channels.
Third, the structures of power set up by such discrimination are mutually
reinforcing; they tend to concentrate and compound.42 The most disadvantaged
individuals and groups will typically experience stigmatization and discrimination
along several identity vectors. Oppressions are interlocking and stack one upon the
other. While the particular patterning may be historically and culturally specific and
“under continuous processes of contestation and change,”43 systems of oppression
reinforce each other. They are “interrelated rather than conflicting phenomena.”44
These three observations feature, in one form or another, in an extensive
literature on the intersectionality of oppressions and on identity constitution,45

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

277 at 284.
Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 195.
See Froc, supra note 32 at 23.
McCall, supra note 33 at 1786.
Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 195.
Nira Yuval-Davis, “The Citizenship Debate: Women, Ethnic Processes and the State” (1991)
39 Fem Rev 58 at 67.
See Levit, supra note 35 at 233, citing Nancy S Ehrenreich, “O.J. Simpson & the Myth of
Gender/Race Conflict” (1996) 67:4 U Colo L Rev 931 at 945-46.
Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 200.
Levit, supra note 35 at 231.
McCall, a sociologist, defines intersectionality as “the most important theoretical
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where it is recognized that destabilization of the categories of identity is often
critical to positive social change.46 Yet, to summarize, the oppression that the
most marginalized in society experience is a tangle. To pull on one string, to focus
on only one aspect of the disempowerment, is impossible. Different features of
the overall experience are knotted together and the jumble is uniquely and singularly
created by those mutually entwined knots, twists, and threadings.
I am not alone in turning to metaphor to capture the social configuration
of oppression.47 Metaphors abound in academics’ attempts to portray this complex
web of identities in which individuals are sited. Nancy Ehrenreich uses the idea
of symbiosis, the kind of relationship that exists between mycorrhizae fungi
and plants.48 Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis proffer the idea of the
KOOSHTM ball (a child’s toy made up of hundreds of multicoloured rubber
bands tied together at the centre of each) to convey postmodern understandings of the mobile matrix of categories that constitute a nonetheless graspable
individual reality.49 Kimberle Crenshaw originated the image of “intersectionality” to capture issues of African American women’s employment.50
Hester Lessard uses the children’s game of freeing a trapped ice cream truck to
convey ideas about the gridlock created by Charter argument.51 There are many
more examples. The area is rich with turns to creative and engaging depictions of
complex conceptualization.
This use of metaphor by equality theorists is enticing. The proffering of a
clever novel visualization or the contrasting of a new image to more received
conceptualization can “unstick” thinking.52 The effect is a creative and elegant

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

51.

52.

contribution” of women’s studies, understanding it as “the relationships among multiple
dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations.” Supra note 33 at 1771.
Ibid at 1777.
Jennifer Nedelsky notes, more generally, that “[l]aw, like all conceptual systems, relies on
metaphor.” See Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 91 [footnotes omitted].
“Subordination and Symbiosis,” supra note 31 at 277.
“Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible” (1995) 35 Santa Clara L Rev
881 at 899-900.
“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U Chicago
Legal F 139.
“Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage Fundamentalism” in Sheila McIntyre
& Sanda Rodgers, eds, Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) 291 at 292 [McIntyre & Rodgers,
Diminishing Returns].
It is difficult to talk about the use of metaphor without resorting to metaphor.
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literature on this topic. But some critical pause is necessary. Peter Kwan has
written about the use of metaphor, arguing that while metaphors are extremely
helpful in conversations employing high levels of abstraction, it is important that
the metaphor not replace the concept.53 His caution is twofold. First, we must
be careful not to bestow “ontological status to that which properly belongs to
systems of thought.”54 That is, we must not confuse real objects with concepts
that belong simply to systems of thought: “Race, gender, and sexual orientation
are not things like plants and fungi with separate and independent existences.
They are concepts, used within systems of language and culture, to apportion and
police regimes of power.”55 Second, the chosen metaphor must not function to
limit or weaken the conceptual claim that one wishes to make.56 Metaphors risk
in their literalness—which, incidentally, is also part of their value—too rigidly or
narrowly constricting the desired conceptual point. Indeed, “metaphors inevitably
distort or shape our perceptions in the sense that they hide some dimensions
of the phenomenon they refer to and highlight others.”57 The challenge is to
craft the right metaphor for the moment, one that conveys most evocatively the
under-expressed or complex conceptual point one wishes to communicate.
In any case, and independent of the creative imagery employed to convey
these three theoretical points about oppression and identity, the conversation
about interconnected and multiple identity features is an important discussion
to have in the context of social justice aspirations. True, these theoretical
observations are no longer novel or startling.58 But they are nonetheless basic,
unavoidable, and important. These observations therefore bear repeating and
summarizing—they elaborate the tricky background against which social justice
claims and litigation take shape. And, it is my argument that this complexity is
often what the courts fail to contemplate adequately, with clear, persistent, and
troubling doctrinal implications.

53. “The Metaphysics of Metaphors: Symbiosis and the Quest for Meaning” (2002) 71:2 UMKC
L Rev 325 at 327.
54. Ibid at 328.
55. Ibid at 328-29 [footnotes omitted; emphasis in original].
56. Ibid at 329.
57. Nedelsky, supra note 47 at 98.
58. Ange-Marie Hancock notes that “the idea of analyzing race, gender and class identities
together has existed for over a century.” See Ange-Marie Hancock, “When Multiplication
Doesn’t Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm” (2007)
5:1 Perspectives on Politics 63 at 63.
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II. THE CASES AND THE CHARTER: COMPARISON AND
CHOICE
On occasion, individual Supreme Court justices have come close to recognizing
the complexity of individual identity, at least in principle. For example, Justice
Wilson in the Morgentaler case noted that:
An individual is not a totally independent entity disconnected from the society in
which he or she lives. Neither, however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal
machine in which his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those
of the collectivity. The individual is a bit of both.59

Of course, this is not a remarkable observation. It simply contemplates the
metaphor of separateness and independence as ill-fitting for the full experience of
the individual in community and notes a tension in the distinction between the
individual and the collective. But, as such, it is certainly the starting place for the
necessarily more layered and nuanced consideration of oppression that social justice
necessitates. Yet the fuller reach of recognition of complex identity is lacking.
In this Part, the analysis turns to many of the cases in which litigants from
across Canada have tried to leverage Charter rights into successful claims for
a more just distribution of resources. As already mentioned, the discussion is
limited to cases involving one or both of sections 7 and 15. The review is not a
complete cataloguing, nor is it more than merely illustrative. Instead, the hope
is, through recollection of some tough cases, to adumbrate the major snares in
which social justice litigation under these two sections is likely to get caught.
More directly, this Part identifies two doctrinal challenges or impasses that have
resulted from inadequate judicial acknowledgment of the theoretical lesson
proffered by feminist identity theorists. First, social justice litigation demands a
subtle and layered unpacking of individual features at play in any claim of harm
made by a claimant. This sets up a problem for the inevitable comparison that
section 15 entails and the often unacknowledged harm definition central to a
section 7 analysis. I consider this problem first. The article then turns to the second
problem: social justice claims are often defeated by the ascription of agency or
choice to the claimant as the cause of the harm at root in the claim. Once
ascribed, choice functions to defeat the claimant’s request for state action of any
sort in relation to such harm. I argue that this assignment of choice, and the fact
that such choice matters, rest on faulty conceptualization of the individual in
the context of systemic structures of oppression.
59. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at 164, 63 OR (2d) 281.
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A. COMPARISON: GROUP CONSTITUTION AND CAPTURING HARM

Both section 7 and section 15 analyses demonstrate inadequate attention to the
complex of social divisions in which individuals are interlarded, particularly in reference to how courts understand the use of comparator analysis in section 15 cases and
the crystallization of the harm complained of in section 7 cases. Admittedly, pinning
down group identity is tough—maybe even impossible to do fully in any specific
circumstance—and is certainly politically fraught. As noted, even describing
group identity on a conceptual or theoretical level sends academics off on glorious rounds of metaphor creation. But grasping this complexity is a critical part of
analyses under these sections and is probably unavoidable in social justice claims.
Account must be taken of a “multiplicity of social logics” and attentiveness given to
how difference must be recognized, shared, and ultimately valued.60
1.

SECTION 15

The Supreme Court of Canada has been unwaveringly clear that the equality
protected under section 15 is a comparative concept.61 This means that the Court
will have to select from the infinite variety of individual features that any
claimant possesses those that are the most pertinent, or relevant even, to the
claim, such that an effective, framed, and appropriately narrowed comparison
can take place. But such a tactic is hazardous. It involves judicial judgment as to
what aspects of the claimant are relevant to the claim as the analysis is forced to
select from a complex that is more than simply additive. This risks that courts
will proceed as if only a few of the relevant features or social divisions that make
sense of the individual experiences are involved. The parsing of identity to key
features raises well-discussed problems. It risks blindness to differences within
identity categories, enhancing marginalization of subgroups.62 It also makes
difficult the recognition of the socially constructed nature of identity; justification
of identity framing will often emphasize ideas of natural or innate qualities.63
Diminished is appreciation for the constructed, multiple, and elastic character
60. Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics, 2d ed (London, UK: Verso, 2001) at 188.
61. In the Court’s first s 15 case, McIntyre J stated that equality as a comparative concept
may “only be attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in the
social and political setting in which the question arises.” Law Society of British Columbia v
Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at para 26, 56 DLR (4th) 1. See also Law v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 24, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law].
62. Levit, supra note 35 at 227.
63. Ibid at 227-28.
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of individual placement along lines of social divisions. Thus, Patricia Williams
writes that equality analyses risk recasting “the general group experience [of the
marginal] as a fragmented series of specific, isolated events rather than a pervasive
social phenomenon … .”64 Foregrounding too thin or too simple a set of
individual characteristics ignores how oppression redoubles and connects. There
are “political and social consequences of the failure to attend to the many mutual
relationships between identity categories.”65 Yet, equally, having too many features
under consideration threatens the possibility of effective analysis.
The response at both the theoretical and doctrinal levels has been to talk
of intersectionality—a term, as I have already mentioned, coined by Kimberle
Crenshaw and now part of a common equality law lexicon.66 The image of
intersectionality captures the recognition of the cross-weaving character of
identity and anchors anti-essentialist theorizing about the social dynamics of
inequality.67 In an influential article, Leslie McCall has described intersectionality
as referring to “the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of
social relations and subject formations” in order to overcome “the limitations of
gender [for example] as a single analytical category.”68
The idea of intersectionality has come in for critique. Like any metaphor, it is
partial only.69 But it is an image with which Canadian courts are taken. Its acceptance
in the Court’s decision in Law v Canada echoes across other section 15 equality
cases: “There is no reason in principle, therefore, why a discrimination claim
positing an intersection of grounds cannot be understood as analogous to, or
as a synthesis of, the grounds listed in s. 15(1).”70 In an earlier example, Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé, for the minority in Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop, notes:
64. The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard: Harvard University Press,
1991) at 13.
65. Kwan, supra note 53 at 329, citing Ehrenreich, “Subordination and Symbiosis,” supra note
31 at 266, 281-83.
66. See e.g. Mary Eaton, “Patently Confused: Complex Inequality and Canada v. Mossop” (1994)
1:2 Rev Cons Stud 203 at 229; Kerner, supra note 21 at 2.
67. See Emily Grabham et al, “Introduction” in Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersectionality and
Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 1 at
2.
68. McCall, supra note 33 at 1771.
69. Theorists note that the metaphor ignores “areas of the social that exist apart from the meeting
point, or overlap, that intersectionality describes.” See Emily Grabham et al, supra note 67
at 2. For a discussion of both the usefulness and weaknesses of the metaphor, see generally
Dhamoon, supra note 29; Froc, supra note 32; Grabham et al, supra note 67. Even Crenshaw
herself has noted that the metaphor has been employed in a less than useful manner. See
Dhamoon, supra note 29 at 232.
70. Law, supra note 61 at para 94.
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[C]ategories of discrimination may overlap, and ... individuals may suffer historical
ex-clusion on the basis of both race and gender, age and physical handicap, or some
other combination. The situation of individuals who confront multiple grounds of
disadvantage is particularly complex. Categorizing such discrimination as primarily
racially oriented, or primarily gender-oriented, misconceives the reality of discrimination
as it is experienced by individuals.71

Generally, judges treat the idea, at least, of intersectionality as unremarkable.
Using the metaphor, however, is not the same as successfully deploying its
message. There are problems with this judicial turn. Canadian courts have not
translated the theoretical recognition into practical and politically acute argument.
Intersectionality tends to be treated by courts as simply a statement of “a
combination of grounds.”72 The Court has yet to recognize, in theory or doctrine,
that group characterization cannot merely be an additive process. For example, it
is not that discrimination need only be shown on one or the other or several of a
variety of grounds.73 Discrimination is not properly characterized as simply a list
of some number of grounds along which disadvantage occurs.
Certainly, the Court has demonstrated some limited but key aspects of an
effective appreciation of intersectionality’s lessons, albeit formulated differently
than in the language of intersectionality. These are those doctrinal advances in
equality law that prevent overly simplistic and non-fragmented conceptualization
of individual categories such as gender. Thus, the Court has allowed that group
identity can be both over- and under-inclusive. This means that claims of discrimination on the basis of, say, gender cannot be defeated by showing that not
all women receive the discriminatory treatment,74 or that some men also receive
the discriminatory treatment. This doctrinal wisdom prevents the silly conclusions
71. [1993] 1 SCR 554 at 645-46 [citations omitted], 100 DLR (4th) 658.
72. Law, supra note 61 at para 94.
73. One of the few equality cases to attempt, as opposed to merely acknowledge the possibility
of, an intersectional analysis is the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Falkiner v Ontario
(Ministry of Community and Social Services, Income Maintenance Branch). In this case, Laskin
JA argued that: “Multiple comparator groups are needed to bring into focus the multiple
forms of differential treatment alleged.” (2002), 59 OR (3d) 481 at para 72, 212 DLR (4th)
633. Laskin JA then proceeded to look at each ground in turn, as if characterization of the
claimants was additive rather than interactive. His conclusion was that
undertaking different comparisons to assess different forms of differential treatment is consistent with the Supreme Court’s directive to apply the Law analysis flexibly. This flexible
comparative approach reflects the complexity and context of the respondents’ claim and captures
the affront to their dignity, which lies at the heart of a s. 15 challenge. I have concluded that the
respondents have received differential treatment on the basis of sex, marital status and receipt
of social assistance (ibid at para 81).

74. See Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 1219, 59 DLR (4th) 321.
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of earlier cases that treatment of only some women cannot be based on gender or
that treatment that affects many women but also a few men is thereby not genderbased.75 These recognitions encode, without explicit articulation as such, the lesson
that social divisions cross-cut each other. Canadian courts do better on this count
than American courts.76
The Court’s decision in Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General)77 illustrates
a judicial failure to take into account fuller lessons of the theory that spawned
the metaphor of intersectionality. The case involved a challenge, on a number of
constitutional and legislative grounds, to the base amount of welfare benefits
provided for adults under thirty years of age by Quebec law.78 This base rate was
set at approximately one-third the rate of benefits available to older welfare recipients.
Much has already been written about the failure of the Court in Gosselin to afford
the claimant, Louise Gosselin, substantive equality rights.79 I mention the case here
simply to note that the majority’s framing of the claimant group misses key
social divisions shaping claimant experience under the impugned legislation.
Evidence before the Court included extensive testimony from Louise Gosselin
herself about her attempts to subsist on the under-thirty benefit level and her
efforts to participate in the workfare and other government programmes formally
offered to enhance that benefit level. This evidence demonstrated the relevance
of Gosselin’s gender, disability, and economic status to the “acute material and
psychological insecurity, deprivation and indignity” she suffered.80 The Court
rejected the sufficiency of this evidence and considered discrimination only in
terms of the ground of “age.”81 As a result, the harms of which Gosselin complained appear in attenuated form. Failure to capture fully the complexity of the
oppression at issue risks rendering that oppression invisible. The discrimination
becomes “hidden in plain sight.”82 It is like those images, seemingly composed of
75. For an obvious example of such judicial absurdity, see Bliss v Canada (Attorney General),
[1979] 1 SCR 183, 1978 CanLII 25.
76. See Bradley Allan Areheart, “Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII”
(2006) 17:1 Geo Mason U Civ Rts LJ 199.
77. 2002 SCC 84, 4 SCR 429 [Gosselin].
78. Regulation Respecting Social Aid, RRQ 1981, c A-16, r 1, s 29(a).
79. See Young et al, supra note 6
80. Jackman, “Castaways,” supra note 8, at 313.
81. Ibid at 314.
82. Areheart, supra note 76 at 229. For a compatible argument in relation to Native Women’s Assn
of Canada v Canada, [1994] 3 SCR 627, 119 DLR (4th) 224, see Froc, supra note 32 at 42.
Froc contends that the Court ignores the synergy between patriarchy and colonization with
the result that the discriminatory harms the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC)
faces remain unacknowledged. The irony here, to which Froc points, is that NWAC becomes
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many randomly, differently coloured and placed dots that, when viewed through
glasses with red lenses, reveal one shape and when viewed through glasses with
blue lenses, show some other image. Viewed without shaded lenses, the picture
is simply a mess of incoherent coloured dots—there is no pattern, no coherent
image. In the same manner, the ground of discrimination accepted as the lens
for viewing the discrimination claim renders any given harm visible or invisible.
The recent section 15 case of Withler v Canada (Attorney General)83 takes
up this sort of criticism of the Court’s formulation of comparator groups. Specifically, the judgment in this case calls for an approach that takes account of
“the full context”84 of both the claimant circumstances and the effect of the
challenged law on the claimant. The Court recognizes that the casting of
comparator and claimant groups can dull the Court’s appreciation of the harm
at issue.85 It is necessary, the Court states, to look to “a conflux of factors.”86 The
result of this series of acknowledgements is a judicial restatement of the use of
comparator groups in equality analysis: The first step of establishing different
treatment requires only that the claimant establish a distinction based on one or
more enumerated or analogous grounds. It is unnecessary to pinpoint a particular
group that precisely corresponds to the claimant group except for the personal
characteristic or characteristics alleged to ground the discrimination. The claim
should, then, proceed to the second step of the analysis, employing if necessary
a wider variety of contextual understandings of claimant circumstances.87 This
recognition of the importance of judicial framing of claimant circumstances and
the oppression at issue is valuable, but judicial analyses remain vulnerable to
inadequate acknowledgement of complexity and unacknowledged discretion in
narrowing complexity. The Withler decision is itself, in its application of equality
analysis to the facts, vulnerable to this criticism.
Adequate treatment of difference is, without doubt, a doctrinal uphill
struggle. This is an area in which theorists themselves have difficulty conveying and
the problem rather than selective and discriminatory government funding.
83. 2011 SCC 12, 1 SCR 396 [Withler].
84. Ibid at para 40.
85. In support of this contention, the Court cites a number of academic commentaries. See
Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48
McGill LJ 627; Nitya Iyer, “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of
Social Identity” (1993) 19 Queen’s LJ 179; Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of
Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 CJWL 37. See also Dianne
Pothier, “Equality as a Comparative Concept: Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, What’s the Fairest
of Them All?” in McIntyre & Rodgers, Diminishing Returns, supra note 51 at 135.
86. Withler, supra note 83 at para 58.
87. Ibid at para 65.
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translating their observations into pragmatic argument. The complex nature
of oppression and its relationship to identity make comparative analysis tricky.
Possibly, the task required is inevitably done badly; but acknowledgement of
complexity is important. Failure to do so predisposes judicial handling of social
justice claims to inadequacy. Such failure can buttress the very hierarchical relations
at the root of social justice challenges.88
2.

SECTION 7

The complex and prismatic nature of individual identity is also importantly, but
alas equally inadequately, recognized under a section 7 analysis. True, the rights
under section 7 are not comparatively granted, so no comparator group analysis
is required. Thus, capturing the parameters of the comparator group and its contrasts
with other groups is not a formally articulated step of the doctrinal analysis. But
the casting of the claimant and her or his group identity is critical to identification of
the harms appraised under section 7. In this regard, the courts’ analysis in section
7 cases can be as overly simplistic as in section 15 challenges. Failure to articulate
a nuanced shaping of the claimant group under section 7 will limit understanding
of the extent of rights infringement and of its consequent harms. Again, claimant
characteristics as recognized by the courts filter what is perceived to be at issue.
Identity grounds the claims advanced.
A recent British Columbia case, Victoria (City) v Adams89 demonstrates this
clearly. This 2009 case dealt with a challenge to a Victoria municipal by-law by
a number of homeless individuals. The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld,
albeit on slightly narrower grounds, the British Columbia Supreme Court’s
decision declaring unconstitutional those portions of the by-law that prohibited
shelterless people sleeping in parks from erecting temporary overhead shelter,
such as tents, tarps attached to trees, or cardboard boxes.90 The case reads most
straightforwardly as a victory for the rights claimants; in the absence of adequate
public shelter beds, the homeless in Victoria may now sleep outside in public
parks under whatever forms of temporary cover they can muster.91 Literally cold
88. See Grabham et al, supra note 67 at 2.
89. 2008 BCSC 1363, 299 DLR (4th) 193 [Adams (BCSC)]. See also Victoria (City) v Adams,
2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams (BCCA)].
90. See Adams (BCCA), ibid at para 166. The British Columbia Court of Appeal modified
the trial judge’s decision that held the by-law to be unconstitutional because there was an
inadequate number of shelter beds available relative to the number of homeless people.
91. For critical analyses of this case, see e.g. Margot Young, “Rights, the Homeless, and Social
Change: Reflections on Victoria (City) v. Adams (BCSC),” Case Comment (2009) 164 BC
Stud 103; Martha Jackman, “Charter Remedies for Socio-economic Rights Violations:
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comfort perhaps, but a successful section 7 claim nonetheless.92
Pointed comments about the scope of this case aside, a significant feature
of homelessness and shelter availability was left unacknowledged by the courts.93
Shelter availability and suitability specifically, and conditions of homelessness
more generally, are configured by the gender of the homeless population involved.
Women encounter and respond to issues of housing insecurity in ways that are
deeply marked by their gender.94 Traditional shelters are considerably less safe for
women than men.95 These shelters are thus a less accessible and practical form
of temporary shelter for women than for men.96 Judicial assessment of shelter

92.

93.

94.

95.
96.

Sleeping Under a Box?” (Paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Institute
for the Administration of Justice, Ottawa, 2 October 2009).
Of course these citizens have no access to private property of their own—they need public
property on a permanent, not merely temporary, basis. Presumably, they need more than
merely temporary overhead, overnight shelter as part of this. It does, after all, quite often
rain or snow during the daytime in Victoria. For further analysis of this aspect of this and
other cases, see Margot Young, “Sleeping Rough and Shooting Up: Taking British Columbia’s
Social Justice Issues to Court,” forthcoming in Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, eds,
Realizing Social Rights (Toronto: Irwin, 2013). See also Sarah E Hamill, “Private Property
Rights and Public Responsibility: Leaving Room For The Homeless” (2011) 30:1 Windsor
Rev Legal Soc Issues 91.
Arguably, the trial judge in Adams (BCSC) might have had some sense of this, stating in her
judgment that had there been enough shelter spaces, “the case would be different and more
difficult.” See Adams (BCSC), supra note 89 at para 191. The Court of Appeal, however,
appears not to have sensed the more complex and nuanced argument. Compare Adams
(BCCA), supra note 89.
See e.g. Rusty Neal, Voices: Women, Poverty and Homelessness in Canada (Ottawa:
National Anti-Poverty Organization, 2004), online: <http://intraspec.ca/
WomenPovertyAndHomelessnessInCanada.pdf>; Leslie Tutty, Cindy Ogden & Gillian
Weaver-Dunlop, An Environmental Scan of Strategies to Safely House Abused Women
(Calgary: RESOLVE Alberta, 31 October 2008), online: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/resolve/
reports/2008/2008-02.pdf>; Shawn Bayes & Alison Brewin, Bridging the Divide: Building
Safe Shelters for Women and Families in BC (Vancouver: Elizabeth Fry Society, March
2012), online: <http://www.elizabethfry.com/initiatives/documents/Bridging-the-DivideBuilding-Safe-Shelters-for-Women-Families.pdf>; Leslie Tutty, Cindy Ogden & Gillian
Weaver-Dunlop, Feasibility Study for a National Network of Women’s Shelters and Transition
Homes (Calgary: RESOLVE Alberta, 31 March 2007), online: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/
resolve/reports/2007/2007-01.pdf>.
Bayes & Brewin, ibid at 7.
Ibid. Many homeless women do not feel safe in temporary accommodation. Women have a
higher risk of physical and sexual violence and those who reside in co-ed shelters report being
in constant fear of violence from co-resident men. A recent study conducted found that of all
British Columbia shelters, female-only facilities represented only 17 per cent of shelter spaces
available. As a result, undesignated co-ed space is becoming all that is available in many areas.
Increasingly, it is not just women-only shelters that are limited, but also designated women-
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availability will miss this point unless gender is taken into account as a relevant
feature of claimant identity. Neither level of court in Adams did this, though the
issue was raised by the Poverty and Human Rights Centre, who were intervenors
at the Court of Appeal level. But the ramifications of gender—which shape both
the desirability and the actual availability of shelter options for women—were
left judicially unacknowledged.97 Admittedly, such further shaping of the group
of claimants was unnecessary given the simple math of the availability even of
co-ed shelters. This case thus shows how claimant identity, in its full complexity, is
also relevant to the success and shaping of section 7 claims. The character, framing,
and reach of the harms at issue under any section 7 claim necessarily rest on the
conceptualization of the relevant identity features of the group or individual
experiencing these harms.
This general failure to appreciate and to be explicit about the complexity and
fluidity of the connections between individual identity and oppression, and how
individual and group experience is so cast, condemns courts, in their assessment
of redistributive rights claims, to miss the substantial oppressions that form core
injustices in our society. Judicial analyses under both section 7 and section 15
betray too confident and precise a pinpointing of individual and group identity
in light of broader existence, meshing, and patterns of social divisions.

III. CHOICE: AGENCY AND ACTION
This conceptual failure, or lack of attention to complexity, bears unfortunate
fruit in at least one other doctrinal regard. Understanding the social world and
individual identity as multiple and complex has clear implications for how the
idea of choice ought not to figure in constitutional argument. By “choice,” I mean
to capture the idea of individual volition, intention, or agency that underpins
assignment of normative responsibility for outcomes to the individual. The idea
of choice denotes the popular image of the “autonomous, liberal (legal) subject,”
morally responsible for the outcomes of his or her actions.98 This is “the sovereign
self ” residing at the heart of liberalism and fuelling so much of liberalism’s
preoccupation with legitimate state power and with rights as a bulwark against

only space within co-ed shelters. Ibid at 3, 7.
97. Hamill, supra note 92 at 96.
98. Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan, “Introduction” in Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan,
eds, Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (Abingdon, UK:
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 1 at 1.
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such power.99 I have elsewhere cautioned “against understanding ‘choice’—or its
absence—as an essential configuring factor in rights claims under the Charter.”100
I want to elaborate on this concern and tie it to both a judicial failure to appreciate
this underlying complexity as well as the difficulty that claimants have in anchoring
social justice challenges in the Charter.101 Choice as spoiler figures in both section
15 and section 7 cases; it even lurks threateningly in the background of recent
apparent victories for social justice challenges. Three older section 15 cases and
three more recent section 7 cases illustrate this well.102
A. SECTION 15

Two of the section 15 cases I examine involved discrimination claims on the
ground of marital status (not coincidentally an analogous section 15 ground that
involves a central contractualized relationship in our society). Both cases involved
unsuccessful attempts to argue for an equality-mandated expansion of benefits
flowing from opposite-sex, common law relationships. In the first of these, the
2002 case of Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh,103 the claimant, Susan Walsh,
sought revision of the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act104 to include unmarried
opposite-sex cohabitants in the statutory definition of “spouse.” Absent revision,
Walsh was denied the presumption of equal distribution of matrimonial property
upon the dissolution of her common law relationship. The second section 15
case, Hodge v Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development),105 focused on
the Canada Pension Plan requirement that a common law spouse must have
99. Ibid at 28.
100. Margot Young, “Context, Choice and Rights: PHS Community Services Society v Canada
(Attorney General)” (2011) 44:1 UBC L Rev 221 at 248.
101. For an interesting reference to “choice” or individual autonomy in the context of judicial
elaboration of analogous grounds under s 15(1), see Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme
Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality) Baselines” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ
637. Although the focus of her discussion is on contrasting modes of judicial extension of
analogous grounds under s 15, the linkage she draws in one portion of her argument between
“choice” and immutability has interesting resonances with arguments in this article. (Ibid)
at 653.
102. Just before this article went to print, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its
judgment in Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, 21 RFL (7th) 1. Interestingly,
the dissenting judgments of Justice Abella and Chief Justice McLachlin would confine
consideration of “choice” to s 1 justificatory arguments. However, the majority judgment was
not similarly attuned to the same concerns. Justice LeBel wrote the majority judgment and
followed a line of reasoning consistent with that critiqued in this article.
103. 2002 SCC 83, 4 SCR 325 [Walsh].
104. RSNS 1989, c 275.
105. 2004 SCC 65, 3 SCR. 357 [Hodge].
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cohabited with the pension contributor for at least one year prior to survivor
pension eligibility. There was no such requirement for a married spouse. Betty
Hodge argued that, relative to separated but still married couples, this constituted
discrimination against her relationship type.
The judgment in Walsh is most obviously stalked by the willful claimant, a
claimant who opts for circumstances of which she then complains. The majority
decision to reject the equality complaint, written by Justice Bastarache, concludes
that the presence of consent and choice is crucial: “A decision not to marry should
be respected because it also stems from a conscious choice of the parties.”106 The
distinction drawn by the matrimonial property exclusion respects this decision
not to marry. To find otherwise, the majority asserts, would be to use the Charter’s
guarantees of equality and respect for individual dignity to undermine the
autonomous exercise of individual choice.107 This would be a failure to actually
respect the complainant’s dignity. Justice Bastarache thus trumpets the primacy
of choice: “choice must be paramount.”108 Liberty is an underlying value of the
Charter and, as such, it informs the inquiry into discrimination.109 The claimant
is “free to take steps” necessary to address through her own agency any concerns
about private property distribution upon relationship breakdown.110 With choice
so centrally assumed, the harm such choice could have avoided cannot be the
basis for state obligations under section 15.
Reliance on choice, or agency, is less obvious but still powerful in Hodge.
Much of the reasoning in this case revolves around identifying the appropriate
comparator group for Betty Hodge. The majority casts the comparator group so
as to remove from the frame any unequal treatment of the claimant and others in
similar circumstances.111 This leaves the Court vulnerable to my earlier critique
that its analytical lens is shaded selectively to leave some oppression invisible.
However, in its last substantive paragraph of the judgment, the Court effectively
unravels its own reasoning when it states:

Walsh, supra note 103 at para 55.
Ibid at para 43.
Ibid.
In the Walsh decision, Bastarache J said: “it is important to note that the discriminatory
aspect of the legislative distinction must be determined in light of Charter values. One of
those essential values is liberty … . Limitations imposed by this Court that serve to restrict
this freedom of choice among persons in conjugal relationships would be contrary to our
notions of liberty” (ibid at para 63).
110. Ibid at para 55.
111. Justice Binnie, for the Court, stated that the relevant comparison was to divorced spouses, for
whom survivor benefits were equally not available. Hodge, supra note 105 at para 47.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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[T]he foregoing analysis deals with heterosexual couples, not homosexual couples.
Until such time as the issue of same-sex marriage has been resolved, it is possible that
different considerations would apply to gay and lesbian relationships in respect of a
survivor’s pension because, at least in the past, the institution of a legal marriage has
not been available to them.112

This is the reader’s “Aha!” moment in this decision. The formal possibility for
the claimant as a member of a heterosexual couple to choose marriage justifies
the finding that Hodge has no right against the state to address her consequent
circumstances that flow from her rejection of this option. When one makes the
“wrong” choice, one seemingly has no right.
We can see a similar assumption of claimant agency underpinning disentitlement in the Gosselin case as well. In the trial judgment, Louise Gosselin herself is
presented as largely to blame for her own unfortunate circumstances:
En effet, il est constant que l’être humain qui a développé les qualités de force,
courage, pérséverance et discipline surmonte et maîtrise généralement les obstacles
éducatifs, psychiques et même physiques qui pourraient l’entraîner dans la pauvreté
matérielle.113

The majority judgment of the SCC, written by Chief Justice McLachlin, reiterates
this assessment implicitly in its first paragraph:
Louise Gosselin was born in 1959. She has led a difficult life, complicated by a
struggle with psychological problems and drug and alcohol addictions. From time
to time she has tried to work, attempting jobs such as cook, waitress, salesperson,
and nurse’s assistant, among many. But work would wear her down or cause her
stress, and she would quit.114

Further on in her judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin returns to such explanatory
statements, noting that Gosselin faced “personal problems, which included
psychological and substance abuse components.”115 The case became one about
“bad, individual choices … overridden by state-imposed choice, purportedly in
the interest of (future) dignity.”116 There was no discrimination. State action was a
112. Ibid at para 48.
113. Gosselin c Québec (Procureur general), [1992] RJQ 1647 at 266, JQ no 928 (Qc Sup Ct) (QL)
as cited in Jackman, “Castaways,” supra note 6 at 320. Translation as offered by Jackman:
“In effect it is always the case that a human being who has developed qualities of strength,
courage, perseverance and discipline generally overcomes and masters the educational,
psychological and even physical obstacles that could pull him into material poverty.”
114. Gosselin, supra note 77 at para 1.
115. Ibid at para 48.
116. Sheila McIntyre, “The Equality Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court: Back to the 70s”
(2010) 50:2 Sup Ct L Rev 129 at 176 [McIntyre, “Equality”]. See also Dianne Pothier, “But
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corrective for bad choice (individual agency), and the consequences of such state
action followed from the original poor choices of the individual. The notion of
choice and individual agency agilely defeat Gosselin’s claim.117
B. SECTION 7

Similar invocation of choice shadows recent judicial analysis in both the Insite118
and Adams cases. The Insite case involved challenges to federal criminalization of
activities in a provincially run, supervised safe injection site. Adams, as already
detailed, dealt with a challenge to a municipal by-law prohibiting temporary
shelter in public parks. In both cases, section 7 rights were more easily claimed
due to the trial judges’ factual findings that choice was not meaningfully implicated
in the claimants’ circumstances. The trial judge in Insite sees addiction as the
result of a range of
personal, governmental and legal factors: a mixture of genetic, psychological,
sociological and familial problems; the inability, despite serious and prolonged
efforts, of municipal, provincial and federal governments, as well as numerous
non-profit organizations, to provide meaningful and effective support and solutions;
and the failure of the criminal law to prevent the trafficking of controlled substances
in the DTES.119

Individual volition is not a significant feature in this list.
In Adams, the claimants’ homelessness was similarly attributed to a matrix
of factors, of which individual will was equally an insignificant element. In each
case, the relevant attorney general argued that the activities regulated—drug
addiction or supervised injection in Insite and homelessness in Adams—were
simply “lifestyle” choices.120 Judicial rejection of these arguments and acceptance of
the absence of choice as a determining factor in each set of claimants’ circumstances

117.

118.
119.
120.

It’s for Your Own Good” in Margot Young et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and
Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 40.
For a similar argument in relation to Symes v Canada, [1993] 4 SCR 695, 110 DLR (4th)
470, see Rebecca Johnson, Taxing Choices: The Intersection of Class, Gender, Parenthood, and
the Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002). Johnson argues that Beth Symes, the s 15 claimant
in this case, figures as the selfish, wilful working mother who complains of the results of her
own choices. From this perspective, her claim is defeated. Froc regards this case also as an
illustration of the Court’s trouble in recognizing that privilege and subordination can cooccur. See Froc, supra note 32 at 28.
PHS Community Services Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 BCSC 661, 293 DLR
(4th) 392 [Insite (BCSC)], aff’d 2010 BCCA 15, 314 DLR (4th) 209 [Insite (BCCA)].
Insite (BCSC), ibid at para 89.
This argument was made by the Attorney General of Canada in Insite (SCC), supra note 18
(Factum of the Appellant at para 97).
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enabled a relatively uncomplicated tale of government interference with protected
liberty, life, and security of the person. Thus, very crucially, successful assertion of
section 7 rights in these cases relied on judicial rejection of government arguments
that individual blameworthiness or wilful choice should be considered a significant
factor in generating the harm about which the claimants complained.
The courts left open the possibility that the presence of choice—in another
scenario—might result in just the kind of disentitlement the government pled in
each case. That is, choice might have mattered as it did in the section 15 cases
just discussed. This retention of choice as an assessment factor in both section 15
and section 7 cases ignores the lessons of intersectionality theory. It parlays the
courts’ own language about contextual analysis into the very kind of denial of
inevitable and deep context cautioned against by theorists. If choice so matters,
then the courts ignore the clear message of much social theory that individual
actions and choices are constrained, shaped, and made possible by larger systemic
norms, structures, and institutions. At the very least, individual circumstances
reflect a complicated “intermingling among issues of agency, exposure, and
vulnerability … .”121 Individual choice is always compromised by historic
and current material and symbolic systems. Simple causal invocation of choice
reduces the social matrix that theorists attempt to capture to a false simplicity.122
Acceding to the picture of the social world painted by the observations detailed
in Part I demands that individual autonomy or agency be understood in a particular
way. Individual choice must be seen as constructed and limited by material and
symbolic conditions, both systemic and individual. Indeed, the very oppression
of which claimants complain will also constrain their choices.123 Thus, the greater
the inequality or injustice that claimants face, the less meaningful ascription of
choice may be. Social and economic structures “channel … outcomes”124 for
individuals: “preferences might themselves be a result of deep-seated constraints
within the social structure.”125 Through such processes, inequality is systemically
enforced: “perspectives of the powerful define and shape individual and cultural

121. Robert RM Verchick, “Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental Justice” (2008) 13:4 Cardozo
JL & Gender 791 at 800.
122. For an explanation of the development of the matrix metaphor, see Froc, supra note 32.
123. See generally, Razack, supra note 20; Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge, UK:
Polity, 1988).
124. Sheila McIntyre, “Backlash Against Equality: The ‘Tyranny’ of the ‘Politically Correct,’”
(1993) 38:1 McGill LJ 1 at 29 [McIntyre, “Backlash”].
125. Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 14.
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definitions of value … rationaliz[ing] existing unequal distributions of power.”126
Even “meaningful” choice often reflects oppressive background conditions and
cannot be distilled from that oppression. That an individual can be understood
to have “chosen” something is not necessarily adequate to justify the outcomes
that follow from such a choice. This is, at least partly, because choice is seldom
unconstrained or unframed by context and circumstances.127
Others have also made this observation. Sandra Fredman refers to the “social
meaning of choice”128 and Diana Majury to the necessity of a “more sceptical,
problematized approach to choice.”129 Sheila McIntyre has echoed concern about
the “ascription to the claimant of unencumbered free choice.”130 Courts have also,
on occasion, seen that choice can be illusory. In Miron v Trudel,131 both Justice
McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé found a section 15
infringement in part on the basis of an absence of meaningful choice. Similar
recognition has occurred in relation to other rights in the Charter. For example,
referring to the section 2(a) right in the case of Zylberberg v Sudbury Board
of Education (Director),132 the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the option
of choice in these circumstances for these complainants was formal only. The
real option was simply “compulsion to conform to the religious practices of the
majority” as “children are disinclined at this age to step out of line or to flout
‘peer-group norms.’”133
However, I want to go further and reject completely the utility of reference
to choice as a mechanism for rejecting a rights claim. Justification for this is both
theoretical and political, as I have argued before.134 The configured and contingent
character of choice—as social theorists elaborate—means that the criterion of
choice is inadequate to foreclose a rights analysis. Judges are ill-suited to disentangle
126. McIntyre, “Backlash,” supra note 124 at 29 [citations omitted].
127. It is also because even “meaningful” choice may result in subordinating and oppressive
outcomes that a substantive equality analysis might condemn the harm, whether or not these
outcomes were “chosen.” See Part III(C), below.
128. Supra note 125 at 14
129. “Women Are Themselves to Blame: Choice as a Justification for Unequal Treatment” in Fay
Faraday, Margaret Denike & M Kate Stephenson, eds, Making Equality Rights Real: Securing
Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 209 at 215.
130. McIntyre, “Equality,” supra note 116 at 176.
131. [1995] 2 SCR 418 at paras 95-97, 153, 23 OR (3d) 160.
132. (1988) 65 OR (2d) 641, 52 DLR (4th) 577 [Zylberberg cited to OR]. Thanks to Benjamin
L Berger for pointing out these commonalities in the area of freedom of religion. For a
perceptive discussion of choice and freedom of religion, see Berger, supra note 36.
133. Zylberberg, ibid at para 38.
134. Young, “Unequal,” supra note 16.
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the social and individual factors that shape, limit, or expand choice. This is most
apparent in relation to those individuals most marginalized or disadvantaged in
Canadian society—individuals whose social, economic, and cultural experiences
least match the biographical facts of the average Canadian judge.135 The vulnerabilities and constraints of marginality and extreme disadvantage may be alien to the
judges who sit in determination of these rights claims and therefore too difficult for them to discern and appreciate. Looking to choice risks inaccurate
attribution of agency as the fulcrum on which a case should turn. It is objectionable to persist in using an element in rejecting rights claims that promises
to be so often misread and thus misused, particularly in relation to those most in
need of their rights. Thus, theory about “the true variety of human experiences”136
should lead us to reject judicial reflection on the presence or absence of choice as
justification for relieving the state of obligation under a Charter right.
The other—political—point is that foregrounding choice (either its absence
or its presence) as a means of establishing state responsibility asserts a model
of individual accountability and a corresponding lack of state responsibility
that ill fits progressive rights protections. Indeed, it sits uncomfortably with
claims for a progressive society marked by collective concern for inclusion,
human flourishing, and social justice. It should not be the case that harms
are addressable as rights claims only when individual choice does not cause the
outcome at issue in some manner. More powerfully, why should we obsess with
“fault” where human flourishing is imperilled? We have abandoned defendant
intent as relevant to the determination that discrimination has occurred or that
some discriminatory harm has been experienced by the claimant. Similarly,
rejecting claimant choice as relevant to defendant obligation is equally fitting.
Rights under the Charter must do more than simply abandon the unfortunate—
however implicated they are in their own misfortune—to their miserable fates.
Thus, choice—even a reasonable finding of the availability of meaningful
choice—should never alone excuse the state from obligations under section 7
and section 15. Even if it were reasonably possible to ascertain when choice was
and was not meaningfully available to avoid or shape the situation of which the
rights claimant complains, such choice or agency should nonetheless not matter.
The focus instead should be on the harm that is apparent. Focus on choice or
agency risks, in the words of political theorist Elizabeth Anderson, neglecting
“the distinctively political aims of egalitarianism” relevant to both equality rights

135. Ibid at 197.
136. Levit, supra note 35 at 227.
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and liberty rights.137 Anderson’s notion of “democratic equality,” something she
argues is characteristic of a just society, grants to all citizens “effective access to the
social conditions of their freedom at all times”138 and “neither presume[s] to tell
people how to use their opportunities nor attempt[s] to judge how responsible
people are for choices that lead to unfortunate outcomes.”139 Inequality and
constraints upon fundamental freedoms relevant to sections 7 and 15 obligate
the state to respond on the basis of substantive theories of equality and citizenship
alone, not because of the additional absence of individual complainant culpability
or blame. A society where oppression and exclusion are tolerated or excused is
not a society marked by equality and liberty. If such an unjust society is not
what we want our society to be, then it cannot be what we allow our Charter
to overlook.140
Attaching inquiry into the presence or absence of meaningful individual
choice to standard section 7 or section 15 doctrinal analysis is a variant of the
“state action” question, transposed into an additional Charter locale. Or, at least,
it is the negative counterpoint to such a concern. Only if the individual has not
somehow “caused” the harm will the state be potentially obligated. This is the risk
that focus on claimant choice engages. Thus, even if some form of state action
has already been shown under the section 32 argument (or not discussed but
assumed), identification of another actor or other source of agency will potentially
remove the constitutional burden from the state. The state, in effect, gets two
chances to absolve itself of responsibility.141
The force of such an imposition lies with the idea of the neo-liberal citizen as
rational chooser of all of his or her life circumstances. The world such an individual
inhabits is not only uncompromised by differences in bargaining power but also
one in which individuals are unmarked by context. “Difference” is irrelevant and the
individual remains “free to take steps to deal with [the situation]” about which
she or he complains.142 As Sheila McIntyre notes, invocation of choice as tonic to a
137.
138.
139.
140.

Elizabeth S Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” (1999) 109 Ethics 287 at 288.
Ibid at 289.
Ibid.
Although not a part of the immediate argument, erasing the distinction between negative
and positive state obligations follows.
141. See also Sagen v Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter
Games, 2009 BCSC 942, 98 BCLR (4th) 109, aff’d 2009 BCCA 522, 98 BCLR (4th) 141.
The BCSC decision illustrates a similar reoccurrence in the s 15 context, this time in relation
to the agency of the third party, the International Olympic Committee. The same illogic or
unfairness in the substantive rights analysis permits a successful s 32 claim to founder on the
absence of state action. On appeal, the s 32 stage instead was the basis for dismissing the claim.
142. Walsh, supra note 103 at para 55.
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discrimination claim “individuates a collective and systemic problem.”143 It turns
systemic unfairness into individual bad choice, and the historic and layered harms
of the marginal and dispossessed are foisted off as personal failure and foible.
C. CHOICE AND LIBERTY

The assertion of the unsuitability of choice to short circuit rights claims leaves me
in a tricky spot. So, I end this consideration of choice as an unfortunate presence in
social justice constitutional challenges by noting that the argument must finesse
a rather sticky point about liberty. The value of liberty is central to the rights that
our Charter protects. As already noted, the Court understands equality rights to
be informed by individual dignity, a key component of which is respect for the
individual’s autonomy. The equality analysis in Law, since overtaken by Kapp,144
foregrounds dignity in a way that makes clear the connection between choice
and the core purpose of equality: “the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) is concerned
with the realization of personal autonomy and self-determination.”145 And, of
course, liberty is explicitly protected by section 7. The Supreme Court of Canada
has been unwavering in its insistence that the liberty interest enshrined in section
7 protects intimate choice and important personal agency. I do not mean to
disrupt this observation. But in light of this, can it make sense to cast off so fully
the relevance of the presence of individual agency for judicial rejection of rights
challenges? Can agency, or choice, matter for the purpose of establishing a formal
entitlement, but not at all as an explanation for individual claimant circumstances
that relieves others of responsibility? Moreover, for marginalized and oppressed
groups, the language of choice and empowerment is not of small import.146 Surely,
the groups championed by social justice claims have fought hard for these markers
of liberal personhood. What then of my rejection of choice as relevant to relieving
the state of rights obligations?
Some insights from a recent work by Jennifer Nedelsky are useful here.
Nedelsky notes that the capacity for action, for agency, for freedom, and for
human will are insistently “cherished and protected” in Western culture.147 But
Nedelsky charts a different course for understanding the relationship between the

McIntyre, “Equality,” supra note 116 at 177
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individual and the collective than employment of the metaphor of “boundary.”
She contests this imagery, arguing that it “distorts our understanding by splitting
it off from, and setting it up in opposition to, the integration, interpenetration,
and unity that are also part of our humanness and without which the capacity
for creative action would not exist.”148 In essence, we are both autonomous and
dependent—characteristics that are, paradoxically, mutually enabling. It is this
chord of tension between autonomy and dependence that I wish to emphasize
and that my partial critique of the relevance of choice plucks. My distress at
the prospect of constitutionally legitimated abandonment by the collective of
the unfortunate among us leads me to conclude that it is coherent to respect
choice or agency as protected by rights, but not to allow attribution of choice
or agency to derail claims for fundamental justice and equality from the state
when rights-relevant harms are shown. Tolerating tension between independence
and vulnerability as equal parts of the human condition allows for, and indeed
demands, this.

IV. CONCLUSION
Transposition of complex theoretical discussions about oppression and subordination into the legal arena of Charter rights litigation is challenging. There is no
simple formula for enabling judges to see what must be seen and to acknowledge
what must be acknowledged in the varied contexts of the cases that represent,
discretely, larger systemic injustices and failures. Theorists have generated a raft of
metaphors in the attempt to convey effectively how power sorts individuals and
groups. No one metaphor can do this completely, but these metaphors are aids
in ensuring that a critical capacity to re-imagine, and then re-imagine again, is
possible. This does not mean that metaphors do not become stale and limiting,
but it does mean that they are important tools in a complex task. The point is to
recognize the limitation of our methods and modes of capturing what is inarguably
a dense and sticky matrix of social divisions and logics. Judges, no less than social,
legal, and political theorists, must struggle with how to appreciate this even as
their task demands more simple and expeditious analysis.
In a sense, then, court judgments are like maps.149 Boaventura de Sousa
Santos writes that maps, in order to meet their purpose, must “inevitably distort
148. Ibid.
149. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, among others, proposes a variant of this metaphor. He refers to
“law” rather than “judgments” in Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in
the Paradigmatic Transition (New York: Routledge, 1998) at 458.

698

(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

reality.”150 This does not mean, however, that maps must be inaccurate or not
useful. But it does mean that maps have variable possibilities as to the scale or
detail represented, a particular compromise as to what is projected largely and
what is not, a fixed place of view that is privileged, and systems of shorthand
or “signs” that are (or are not) conventionally determined.151 Cases, as artefacts of
law, share these features. The judge, like the cartographer, has the task of making
decisions about how to orchestrate implementation of these features. I am arguing
for better, more attentive, self-conscious, and acknowledged mapping by judges
in social justice cases. Otherwise, judicial erasure of larger systemic conditions
and structures as important features of individual and collective circumstances
simply ensures that points of access for effective use of Charter rights are made
invisible or politically unavailable. This is particularly the case for those claims
that issue from the most socially marginalized and politically oppressed. And, social
justice will continue to elude our society, or, at least, it will not be substantively
advanced by Charter litigation.
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